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Editor’s Introduction
We are very excited to be entering the second volume year of Genocide Studies and
Prevention. Our first three issues were diverse and contained some of the most
important new research in the field. As we enter our second year, and publish our first
issue of volume 2, we hope to continue that tradition.
Broadly speaking, GSP 2:1 focuses on the prevention of genocide. The lead article,
by Thomas Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science and Director of the Ralph
Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York, examines genocide prevention in the real world of politics.
Weiss points out that, ‘‘except for the label, the responses of the international
community of states to Rwanda and Sudan were comparable.’’ He notes that ‘‘perhaps,
as Scott Straus has argued in these pages, we have invested too much time and energy
in parsing the ‘G-word.’’’
In this sense Weiss is a perfect supplement to David Scheffer’s arguments,
originally published in GSP 1:3, concerning the need for a new category of crime.
Weiss, however, is interested more in making genocide prevention a political reality
than in changing the definition of the crime. His article, as he notes, ‘‘explores the
chasm between norms and practice for both military and civilian humanitarians.’’
Weiss looks at what he calls ‘‘five impediments to human protection in genocidal
contexts: resistance from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); blow-back from 9/11;
a distracted superpower; spoilers, war economies, and privatization; and the civilian
humanitarian identity crisis itself.’’
All these, Weiss argues, constitute a threat to ‘‘international order and justice.’’
He points out how, in most instances, civilians under attack or under siege in war
zones want intervention, yet rhetoric continues to replace action and the dead
and dying continue to wait. It is this waiting and lack of action that motivated
David Scheffer, US ambassador at large for war crimes issues from 1997 through 2001
and currently the Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw/Robert B. Helman Professor of Law and
director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University,
in the lead article of GSP 1:3, to issue an exciting and interesting call for a new genre
of human-rights crimes. The Scheffer article may be found in GSP 1:3 and online at
http://utpjournals.metapress.com.
Scheffer argues that the term ‘‘genocide’’ imposes limitations on action to protect
human rights, and he calls for a new category of international law, ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
The purpose here, he argues, is to ‘‘simplify and yet render more accurate both the
public dialogue and legal terminology describing genocide and other atrocity crimes.’’
Since the editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention found Scheffer’s proposal so
interesting and innovative, we invited some of the leading scholars in the study of
genocide to comment on his presentation. In the lead commentary, William Schabas,
a professor of human rights law at the National University of Ireland, Galway, and
director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, closely examines Scheffer’s proposal.
Schabas points out that similar ideas have been floated earlier but never appeared to
gain support. He proceeds to argue that ‘‘there are many recent developments favoring
this drive for greater coherence and more simplicity.’’
Schabas notes that the international tribunals, in fact, have pointed in the
same direction and that, for example, ‘‘with rare exceptions, every ‘atrocity’ committed
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized as both a war crime and a crime against
humanity.’’ After outlining the conclusion of the United Nations commission of inquiry
into Darfur, which did not find that genocide was committed but did say that ‘‘crimes
against humanity appeared to have been committed and that there was no reason to
think that this made the matter any less serious,’’ Schabas moves on to point out that
‘‘on the political level, there is also a marked tendency toward consolidation of the
categories of international crime.’’
Schabas appears to believe that ‘‘Scheffer’s proposal may well be an idea whose time
has come.’’ He traces the historical evolution of the concepts discussed by Scheffer and
analyzes and explicates an important distinction between ‘‘crimes against humanity’’
and ‘‘genocide.’’ In this very important analysis, which space precludes my recounting,
he also points out why there was no ‘‘Convention on Crimes against Humanity.’’
Schabas notes that this ‘‘gap in international law was really only closed with
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in July 1998.’’
Schabas further notes that at the end of the 1940s we could see the ‘‘very clear
beginnings of the elaborate system of international humanitarian law that we know
today.’’ It was, he contends, ‘‘characterized by drastic limitations with respect to
definitions of crimes and the obligations they imposed,’’ and the evolution of these is
the underpinning of Scheffer’s proposal. Schabas believes that the ‘‘logical consequence
of Scheffer’s suggestion may be to abandon altogether the use of the terms ‘genocide,’
‘crimes against humanity,’ and ‘war crimes.’’’ In fact, Schabas notes that ‘‘in terms of
international law, Scheffer is absolutely right.’’
Schabas concludes that the term ‘‘genocide’’ will not disappear and states that his
‘‘preference would be to restrict the definition of genocide in order to ensure its
stigma.’’
The second commentary, by Martha Minow, a professor of law at Harvard
University, begins by agreeing with what Minow calls ‘‘Scheffer’s thoughtful and
practical call for separating the political and legal uses of ‘genocide’ and for devising
the broader categories of ‘atrocity crimes’ for public communication about genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.’’
Pointing out how Scheffer’s frustration with the existing categories must have
motivated his effort, Minow notes that ‘‘the problems that he addresses will not be
cured with new words, and it is a matter of some interest that a person of Scheffer’s
wisdom and expertise would put his emphasis in that direction.’’ Minow raises three
main issues with Scheffer’s proposal. First, she argues that ‘‘renaming legal categories
will do little to address underlying problems of leadership and will.’’ Second, ‘‘for public
communication, the term ‘atrocity crime’ loses the specificity of ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes
against humanity’ without offering clarity in return’’; third, ‘‘doing something to
get people to think and act is crucial.’’ She elaborates each of these issues and provides
an entirely interesting critique.
Sévane Garibian, a PhD candidate in law at the University of Paris, begins her
commentary by pointing out that Scheffer’s separation of ‘‘the criminal character of
genocide from its political reality is appealing.’’ Garibian, however, proposes to reverse
Scheffer’s proposal and to focus on the ‘‘legal application of intervention—as a tool
for prevention.’’ She notes that she feels ‘‘uneasy’’ with Scheffer’s distinction between
‘‘a legal and a political application of the concept of genocide.’’ She believes that the
‘‘legal definition is, and should remain, applicable in all cases’’ and that intervention
to prevent genocide should be determined by what she refers to as ‘‘a sharper legal
understanding of intervention.’’
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After elaborating her arguments, Garibian turns her attention to Scheffer’s
proposal to create a new category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ and ‘‘atrocity law.’’ Here she
argues that there are two main reasons to support Scheffer’s proposal because,
in her terms, it ‘‘reflects the spirit underlying the codification work done by both the
International Law Commission (ILC) and the drafters of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) statute.’’ She outlines four ways in which this is the case and concludes
her analysis by arguing that intervention remains an important and controversial
issue that cannot be brushed aside by reference to a new category of international
crime. Garibian notes that ‘‘support for the international implementation of minimum
human rights in the face of severe governmental abuses and criminality should not
disguise the risk of a postcolonial revival of interventionary diplomacy.’’
Michael J. Bazyler, professor of law and the ‘‘1939’’ Club Law Scholar in Holocaust
and Human Rights Studies at Whittier Law School, places Scheffer’s proposal in the
tradition of Raphael Lemkin and others who followed him in attempting to eradicate
what Bazyler calls a ‘‘great blot on both international law and international
diplomacy’’—the fact that ‘‘we have failed miserably to make [Lemkin’s] dream into
reality and relegate genocide to the trash bin of history.’’ Bazyler points out that
we have tried and that ‘‘numerous proposals—some put into practice—have been
offered for the last fifty years to make the work of genocide prevention more effective.
The topic has also been the subject of numerous books, articles, policy papers,
and speeches.’’
Bazyler catalogues some of the most prominent of these, from Charny and
Rappoport’s proposed early warning system through Gregory Stanton’s stages of
genocide and Kofi Annan’s creation of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, and notes that the ongoing events in Darfur highlight the frustration
and continued lack of effectiveness in prevention of genocide. Scheffer’s proposal is,
Bazyler points out, another in this long line of proposals ‘‘to make genocide prevention
more effective.’’
Bazyler agrees with Scheffer’s contention that the ‘‘legal definition of genocide, as
found in the UNCG, has acted as a constraint to genocide prevention.’’ Yet he believes
that ‘‘if a historical event, including those occurring before the enactment of the
UNCG, bears substantial similarity to events already recognized as genocide—
whether it be the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide—the term ‘genocide’ must be
used to describe that event.’’ He notes, however, that it is in the political arena that,
‘‘on purely practical grounds, Scheffer’s suggestion that the use of the ‘G-word’ is best
avoided is sound.’’
Bazyler also thinks that the use of the term ‘‘atrocity’’ helps as a means to
categorize genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and is a useful tool that
substitutes one word for a series of ‘‘complex and hard-to-understand legal meanings.’’
Bazyler notes, importantly, that, as Scheffer points out, the fact that the term
‘‘atrocity’’ has no legal meaning gives it an ‘‘advantage over the term ‘genocide,’ since
its use by politicians and diplomats does not trigger any legal ramifications.’’
Finally, Bazyler—accurately, I believe—thinks that ‘‘it remains to be seen whether
the term will catch on, either in the international diplomatic arena or with legal
scholars, the media, and the general public.’’
Martin Mennecke, a doctoral candidate in international law at the University of
Kiel, Germany, follows up the linguistic analysis by asking whether using or not using
the ‘‘G-word’’ contributes to the prevention of genocide. Mennecke points out how
genocide has found its way into international law and the academic community, noting
3
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that the field of genocide studies has expanded rapidly, so that there are
‘‘two international organizations of genocide scholars, four international journals,
and a fast-growing number of related university courses around the world.’’ Yet, he
points out, ‘‘genocide as a crime does not seem to end.’’ In particular, he notes the
discussion of whether or not the events in Darfur fit the definition of genocide. This
brings him to Scheffer’s proposals, which he finds ‘‘both timely and interesting.’’ They
are timely, Mennecke argues, ‘‘because over the last years much has been written
about the genocide-related jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, but little light has
been shed on the meaning of the genocide label and determination for issues of
intervention and prevention.’’ Moreover, he notes, Scheffer’s proposals are interesting
‘‘because he does not give in to the usual reflex of genocide scholars to simply criticize
the legal definition of genocide; instead, he attempts to increase the practical
applicability of the concept of genocide to international politics.’’ Mennecke examines
Scheffer’s proposals not from the perspective of international law but from the
‘‘perspective of genocide prevention.’’ His basic argument is that ‘‘Scheffer’s suggestion
to use the formula ‘precursors of genocide’ repeats the mistakes decision makers
and scholars have made with respect to the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict
in Darfur. To follow Scheffer’s advice outside the research community would be
counterproductive and keep genocide prevention inadvertently in what could be called
the ‘G-word trap’—that is, a misplaced focus on whether a conflict is genocide or not.’’
Finally, however, Mennecke does ‘‘fully endorse Scheffer’s concept of atrocity law as
a welcome tool to reconceptualize genocide as forming a broader category of massive
human-rights violations instead of being in its own league.’’ In fact, Mennecke wishes
to go further than Scheffer: he argues that, ‘‘within the context of genocide prevention,
the label ‘genocide’ should be avoided altogether; using a term such as ‘atrocity crimes’
would benefit attempts to prevent genocide.’’ In an important explanation of the utility
of Scheffer’s idea of ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ Mennecke points out that the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo has not received nearly the attention devoted to Darfur,
possibly because the focus in Darfur has been on labeling the conflict as ‘‘genocide.’’
If, however, a new category of crime, ‘‘atrocity crime,’’ became as well known as
‘‘genocide,’’ it would not matter whether or not a conflict fit the definition of genocide,
and attention could be focused on doing something to stop the killing in conflicts, such
as that in the DRC, where genocide is not charged. Moreover, the use of the concept of
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ could very well evade the excruciating questions of genocidal intent,
as discussed in the UNCG. This conceivably might, as Mennecke suggests, lower the
‘‘very high threshold for genocide (i.e., that the perpetrator has the intent not only
to carry out the acts described in the legal definition of genocide, but to do so with
a view to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to which the victim belongs).’’
He concludes that we should all start thinking that ‘‘what matters is not the ‘G-word’
but the ‘A-word’—atrocity crimes.’’
Up to this point, with some minor exceptions, our commentaries have been very
supportive of Scheffer’s overall proposals. Payam Akhavan, in ‘‘Proliferation of
Terminology and the Illusion of Progress,’’ and Mark Levene, in ‘‘David Scheffer’s
‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes’: A Response,’’ bring to their analyses a more critical
perspective, raising questions about Scheffer’s ideas.
Akhavan, associate professor in the Faculty of Law at McGill University,
argues that ‘‘as scholars and advocates, we are formidable taxonomists and explorers
of distinctions, ever probing new conceptual frontiers in the elusive quest to render
an overwhelming universe of human struggle more coherent and manageable.’’
4

Editor’s Introduction

This is the theoretical background for his primary criticism of Scheffer as pursuing
a ‘‘proliferation of terminology’’ that, Akhavan argues, ‘‘can often become a
self-contained exercise in creating the mere illusion of progress.’’ Moreover,
he continues, ‘‘in some circumstances, it can even divert precious resources away
from the consolidation of existing hard-won norms and institutions.’’ In fact, he points
out that before wholeheartedly accepting Scheffer’s substitution of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
for ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘we need to ask whether the cost-benefit calculus of promoting this
new concept and purported discipline justifies a significant commitment of energy
and resources.’’ Akhavan doubts that this is a useful exercise, expressing ‘‘misgivings
about the relative weight and importance that Scheffer assigns to ‘atrocity crimes’
as a useful instrument for promoting this cause.’’
If I read Akhavan correctly, his elaboration of his argument with reference to the
ongoing ‘‘genocide’’ in Darfur and the earlier ‘‘genocide’’ in Rwanda leads him to worry
that substituting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ for ‘‘genocide’’ might ‘‘actually undermine’’ the
perceived importance of the ongoing violence and lessen the likelihood of intervention.
Rather, in Akhavan’s view, ‘‘what we need most is not a conceptual or rhetorical magic
bullet but, rather, greater focus on integrating and mainstreaming existing concepts
and institutions in the daily habits and rituals of decision makers, with a view to
transforming an entrenched culture of reaction into a culture of prevention.’’
In conclusion, Akahavan asks why it is necessary to ‘‘reinvent the wheel when
existing concepts are more than adequate.’’ He is very eloquent in his criticism
of ‘‘placing faith in abstractions.’’ His second-to-last paragraph merits particular
attention:
We should also consider whether placing faith in abstractions as a means of inducing
the will to act, especially among the wider public, overlooks the vital role of emotional
connection with the stark horror of such situations, where rational
normative schemes are certainly not at the forefront of people’s minds. When looking
at bodies littering the hills of Rwanda or Darfur, is it the schematic labeling that
arouses indignation and empathy, or the intimate face of suffering? Is our inordinate
faith in intellectual concepts and terms and concepts not a privileging of distance over
intimacy, inadvertently placing abstractions over engagement? Is the more powerful
form of cognition in this context not emotional rather than rational? Is it not the
unspeakability of such evil, the ineffability of intense human suffering, that speaks
most loudly to our conscience? The voices of survivors, the cruel reality of hatred and
violence, are more potent than any term that we could devise in our rarified midst as
scholars and advocates.

In the final commentary, Mark Levene, professor of history at Southampton
University, approaches Scheffer’s proposals in a different and stimulating fashion.
Levene notes that he is skeptical, to put it mildly, of what he calls ‘‘Lemkinesque
assumptions as to the development of strengthened juridical instruments aimed at
buttressing existing international law, or in military intervention against violators.’’
In fact, he argues that genocide is ‘‘bound up with the conflicts and tensions of the
broader international political economy,’’ and this means that it cannot be isolated or
treated ‘‘without respect . . . to a wider and more holistic epidemiology of violence in the
modern world.’’ He proceeds to note that ‘‘prevention of genocide, if we are to arrive
there at all, thus, in my reckoning, requires not only a much broader engagement
with the systemic sources of conflict in the contemporary world but a paradigmatic
shift in our approach to the fundamentals of human life on this planet.’’
Stating forthrightly his critique of the general field of ‘‘genocide studies,’’ if such
a thing exists, Levene proceeds to engage Scheffer and note how he bridges,
5
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or attempts to bridge, the ‘‘gap between the legal and political arenas.’’
Levene, therefore, acknowledges that he finds ‘‘Scheffer’s formulations—in their own
terms—perfectly logical and internally consistent.’’
This noted, he proceeds to point out that he continues to harbor ‘‘fundamental
disagreements with Scheffer’s operating premises,’’ though he does ‘‘welcome’’
Scheffer’s attempt to overcome the more ‘‘hidebound,’’ ‘‘inflexible,’’ ‘‘legalistic’’
formulations that have characterized the approach of international lawyers.
Levene, like no other commentator in this collection, points out very clearly, and in
my view accurately, that when we speak of a ‘‘response by the international
community to genocide and atrocity more generally, what Scheffer really means are
the hegemonic elements in this community.’’ He interjects into the discussion an entire
realm of politics often ignored by international lawyers, as well as other scholars who
write about genocide. Levene’s astute criticism even of some of the examples used by
Scheffer, in particular the case of Kosovo, highlights the gap between a critical
perception of international politics and a narrower, legalistic perception. History is
often misperceived, if not rewritten, to highlight the legal example used by the legal
scholar to prove a point.
Levene, in short, adopts what might be called a ‘‘global,’’ systemic, or more holistic
view of genocide. As he notes, the indicators of genocide, those identified by Scheffer
as well as others, must be understood ‘‘in terms of deep, systemic factors, which—as
in the case of the Sahelian desertification—are being driven by a variety of regional,
but increasingly global, factors, above all anthropogenic climate change, which, of
course, would demand of us an entirely more far-reaching project for saving the people
of the Sahel (and the planet entire)’’; or, he continues, ‘‘do we only want to see
precursors in such a way that it allows us—the West, the international community,
whatever you want to call it—to deal simply with the most immediate effects, thereby,
of course, putting to one side the deepest-set, and much more endemic, issues at
stake?’’ Elaborating further these systemic issues, Levene concludes as follows:
‘‘Scheffer’s formulations, in short, are neat, elegant, and concise, but the assumption
that legal formulas can somehow create the framework for the political prevention of
mass violence in the twenty-first century is another example of looking at the problem
through the wrong end of the telescope.’’
David Scheffer responds to his critics in ‘‘The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity
Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity Law.’’’ He points out that he is not, as some of the commentators
suggest, seeking a ‘‘magic bullet’’ that will miraculously end atrocity crimes, but that
action is influenced by words—and it is, after all, action to prevent genocide that is
most important. Addressing each commentator in turn, Scheffer concludes that his
attempt to ‘‘fix the terminological chaos in the realm of atrocities is an endeavor
I gladly undertake.’’ We, the editors, also think it is a useful endeavor, and we thank
Professor Scheffer and all those who have contributed to this interesting exchange.
The editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention are very pleased to offer this broad
array of commentary on the proposals of David Scheffer. The commentators raise most,
if not all, of the most relevant issues confronting those who wish to end the ongoing
cruelty that continues to besiege this beleaguered planet. While there are no quick
and easy solutions offered here, there are important issues addressed, and that,
after all, is a step in the right direction.
Herb Hirsch
Co-editor
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